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The willingness to pay (WTP)/willingness to accept (WTA) disparity raises serious 
questions about preference elicitation techniques based on the Hicksian model of 
decision-making. In this paper we investigate the possibility of incorporating the 
strategies suggested by Plott and Zeiler (2005) in a Pivot Process mechanism and in a 
Choice Modelling experiment to eliminate the WTP/WTA disparity. The goal is to 
improve the reliability of the benefit estimates by comparing and contrasting these 
two methodologies. No methodological and analytical obstacles prevent the use the 
Pivot Process to calibrate the Choice Modelling estimates. By combining the two 
methods, a calibration procedure can be usefully developed to validate good 
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Introduction 
Theory and experiments have been widely used to analyse the disparity between 
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The gap is often 
interpreted as an “endowment effect” where the initial endowment affects the rate of 
exchange between goods. Prospect theory states that endowment effects and loss 
aversion—people commonly value losses much more than commensurate gains—
describe a fundamental feature of human preferences (Tversky and Kahnemann 
1991). The neoclassical model of decision making, on the contrary, assumes that 
preferences do not depend on the current assets and that the initial entitlement does 
not change the final allocation. The WTP/WTA disparity is then taken as evidence 
that individuals do not have Hicksian preferences. Many experimenters have observed 
significant differences between WTA and WTP measures (see Horowitz and 
McConnell 2002); many others have not (see Plott and Zeiler 2005). Hence, the 
observed disparity could be the result of weak methods for preference elicitations. 
That is, in some experimental settings individuals may not reveal their true 
preferences.  
 
The existence and interpretations of the WTP/WTA disparity have important 
implications for the design and implementation of environmental policies. WTA and 
WTP imply different property right regimes. If the two measures diverge, 
environmental policies could be substantially altered by the assignment of property 
rights. For instance, assume the public’s WTP for native vegetation conservation is 
half the WTA compensations for loss of native plants. Also assume developers would 
willingly buy or sell land at the prevailing market prices. The amount of native 
vegetation protected when rights are assigned to developers and had to be purchased 
by the public would be less than the amount protected if the developers had to 
purchase rights from the public (Horowitz and McConnell 2003).  
 
The WTP/WTA anomaly raises some serious questions about preference elicitation 
techniques based on the neoclassical model of preference. An alternative theorythe 
“Discovered Preferences Hypothesis” (see Braga and Starmer 2005) claims some 
anomalies are errors in stated preference that would disappear in environments that 
allow learning. Recent laboratory experiments have indeed showed how a set of   4 
design strategies can control for “subjects’ misconceptions” and eliminate the 
WTA/WTP gap (Plott and Zeiler 2005). This result questions the interpretation of 
observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion.  Hence, the Discovered Preference 
Hypothesis offers hopes in another important direction. If laboratory experiments of 
the type performed by Plott and Zeiler (2005) are anomaly-free, they could provide an 
important empirical point of reference to assess benefit estimates obtained with Stated 
Preference (SP) methods. In other words, they may offer a constructive basis for 
mitigating or calibrating WTA/WTP disparity, or to assess innovations in elicitation 
methods that aim to correct for errors. 
 
In order to assess the use of laboratory experiments to calibrate SP estimates, this 
paper compares and contrasts a SP method and a “direct revelation mechanism” for 
preference elicitation. The aim is to discuss the theoretical and analytical properties of 
the Choice Modelling (CM) technique and the Pivot Process (PP) mechanism. CM is 
a SP technique that generates data from observations of behaviour in hypothetical 
markets. PP also uses hypothetical markets but in conjunction with a mechanism that 
turns the economic commitments into real economic consequences.  Comparing the 
two elicitation methods highlights analytical differences that could cause estimate to 
differ. It also provides for the differences to be resolved either through design 
strategies or econometric procedures. The paper is organised as follow. Section 1 
contains a review of anomalies in SP and the way they have been addressed. In 
section 2, the properties of the PP are discussed. The CM method is introduced in 
section 3. Section 4 contains a set of methodological proposals for combining PP and 
CM. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Anomalies in SP methods. 
Stated preference techniques such as Contingent Valuation (CV) and Choice 
Modelling (CM) are the only available methods for the estimation of ‘passive use’ or 
‘non-use values’. These techniques are based on the creation of hypothetical markets 
for the exchange of public goods. The transactions in hypothetical markets generate a 
set of data which is then used to estimate the benefits of environmental changes.  SP 
techniques are often regarded with scepticism because they are troubled with 
anomalies–i.e. systematic inconsistencies between the theory used to organise the data 
collection and interpretation, and the pattern of individuals’ responses. The disparity   5 
between WTP and WTA is the first anomaly. While the Hicksian theory does not 
imply WTP=WTA (Hanemann 1991), Sudgen (1999) convincingly argues that the 
difference should be small. For an individual with Hicksian preferences, if the WTP is 
only a small fraction of incomeas is expected for environmental goods the gap 
between WTP and WTA should be in the order of few percentage points (Sudgen 
1999, p.159).  Horowitz and McConnell (2002) review 45 WTP/WTA studiesfor a 
total of 201 experimentsand find that WTA is about seven times higher than WTP. 
Theory and estimates are clearly at odds. 
 
A second anomaly in SP studies is the insufficient sensitivity of individual’s 
valuations to changes in the quantity of the goods. A third common anomaly is the 
influence of irrelevant clues on respondents. Sudgen (2005) interprets these two 
inconsistencies as the consequences of respondents’ use of mental processes that do 
not take proper account of quantities but seek for clues to come out with an answer. 
There is indeed an extensive literature on the use of heuristics or rule of thumbs in 
decision making (Gigerenzer and Selten 1999).  
 
In order to improve the reliability of elicitation methods, hypothetical data have been 
enriched with observations obtained with revealed preference methods.  This 
approach combines observations from real but surrogate markets and hypothetical 
markets.  Adamowicz et al. (1994) pioneered this approach in the field of 
environmental valuation. They found sufficient evidence to claim that revealed and 
SP data contain a similar preference structure. They also cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the underlying variance of the two datasets is different. In other words, while the 
parameter point estimates are not statistically different, stated preference estimates 
have larger variance.  
 
Controlled, theory-driven experiments in laboratory settings have also been designed 
to assess the magnitude of the hypothetical bias. Experiments are typically set up as 
direct revelation mechanisms in which individuals have a dominant strategy to reveal 
their true valuation of the good. In SP methods, individual responses to valuation 
questions do not entail a real economic commitment or real economic consequences. 
On the contrary, in experimental valuation, the revelation mechanism entails a real   6 
economic commitment, or consequence, or both. In three simple Dichotomous Choice 
(DC)or take-it-or-leave-itexperiments, Cumming et al. (1995) found that the 
hypothetical DC experiments did not generate the same responses as the real DC 
experiments. List and Gallet (2001) reviewed 29 field and laboratory studies. They 
found that, on average, respondents overstated their preference by a factor of 3 in 
hypothetical settings. In Balistreri et al. (2001), DC and Open-Ended (OE) question 
formats were used to estimate WTP for insurance against an environmental hazard 
with known probability. WTP estimates were then compared with auction values. 
Hypothetical values systematically overestimated auction values. The OE format had 
a bias smaller than the DC format. Also Veisten and Navrud (2006) compared 
hypothetical  DC and Open-Ended (OE) hypothetical experiments to Actual Payment 
(AP) for the provision of an environmental good. Respondents facing DC and AP 
questions stated lower willingness to pay than respondents confronted with just DC 
question or OE and AP questions. The gap between stated and actual WTP was lower 
when respondents face mechanisms that induce truth telling. 
 
Two important developments in experimental economics may offer alternative 
strategies to investigate anomalies in SP. First, Healy (2006) assessed which 
mechanism for public good provision generates the most efficient outcome, i.e. the 
Pareto optimal allocation. Healy compared five mechanismsvoluntary contribution, 
proportional tax, Groves-Ledyard mechanism, Walker mechanism, and a Vickery-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. This last one was found to be the most efficient 
and stable. In repeated rounds the VCG mechanism converged close to the efficient 
equilibrium with over half the subjects truthfully revealing their preference.  
 
Second, Plott and Zeiler (2005) designed a set of controls to reduce or eliminate 
“subject misconceptions”that can loosely define as “confusion”under the 
assumption that it is a source of the WTP/WTA disparity. The first control was the 
use of an incentive compatible mechanism to induce subjects to reveal their true 
preference for private goods. By telling the truth, subjects increase the probability of 
gaining the maximum amount possible. Training was the second control strategy. It 
provides subjects with a basic understanding of the elicitation mechanism. Many 
incentive-compatible mechanisms are indeed unfamiliar to subjects, even if the task   7 
may appear to be a simple buying or selling task.  The third control was a set of 
practice rounds to allow subject to experience the instrument while gaining familiarity 
with its properties. In particular, Plott and Zeiler (2005) used paid practice rounds so 
that subjects were immediately exposed to the consequences of their decisions. And 
finally, the experiments assured anonymity. If decisions are not made anonymously, 
subjects may be concerned with how others view their bids. The main finding of Plott 
and Zeiler’s experiments is that no WTP/WTA disparity is observed. Their primary 
conclusion is that the observed WTP/WTA gaps do not reflect a fundamental feature 
of human preferences. 
  
These results suggest an avenue for further research. Is it possible to eliminate the 
WTP/WTA in an environment for the provision of public goods designed following 
the results of Healy (2006) and Plott and Zeiler (2005)?  How do the WTP and WTA 
estimates in the laboratory compare with estimates from SP techniques for the same 
environmental good? Is it possible to calibrate SP estimates using laboratory 
experiments? However, a cautionary note is needed. It is tempting to consider 
laboratory experiments as an alternative to SP institutions for the valuation of 
environmental changes: couldn’t researchers use laboratory experiments to obtain true 
values instead of estimating values using expensive surveys? However, direct 
revelation mechanisms applied to public goods are still a step removed from real 
markets. They entail real economic commitment and real economic consequences, but 
do not lead to the provision of a public good.  If one were to describe the degree of 
realism of each evaluation technique along a continuum from hypothetical to real 
markets, direct revelation mechanisms applied to public goods would sit exactly 
between state preferences and revealed preference techniques (fig 1).  Direct 
revelation mechanisms have an advantage over revealed preference techniques. The 
latter can only provide information from actual markets. The former–as well as SP 
techniques–can provide information on institutions that are fundamentally different 
from the existing ones. It must also be stressed that eliciting true values in 
experimental settings is clearly dependent on the definition of the public good, the 
source of incentive payment, the size of the interview, and so forth. It is also unclear 
how to extrapolate experiment results to population and other dimensions of the 
public goods.   
   8 
Combining the newly developed strategies in laboratory experiments and in SP could 
provide a better understanding of preference formation and elicitation. The 
simultaneous use of the experimental and stated preference methods aim to: 
a)  estimate WTP and WTA benefit measures for the same environmental changes 
in two institutional contexts. The laboratory experiment and the survey-based 
data generation mechanism should be designed to offer the same hypothetical 
market; 
b)  determine the difference in WTP and WTA estimates within and across 
institutional environments; 
c)  assess the possibility of calibrating benefit estimates whenever the WTP and 
WTA responses do not satisfy Hicksian conditions. 
 
The following sections contain a description of the properties of the PP mechanism 
and the CM method. The aim is to determine if they can be used to evaluate 
preference for the same environmental goods, and understand if there are theoretical 
and methodological obstacles to comparing their respective estimates. 
 
2. Features of the Pivot Process. 
Demand revealing mechanisms for public good provision are usually associated with 
the work of Vickery, Clarke and Groves (see Attiyeh et al. 2000). They were 
originally developed to overcome undesirable properties such as free-riding 
commonly occurring in public good decisions. Demand revealing mechanisms or 
dominant strategy mechanisms are incentive compatible in the sense that it is 
always individually rational to behave truthfully.  
 
There several variants of the demand revealing mechanism. The essence of these 
institutions/tools is that each person pays (or is paid for) the benefit of her actions, but 
no one is charged (or credited) as required by budget balance. In these environments, 
participants are motivated to reveal their preferences through a tax mechanism which 
rewards truthfully presentation and penalises concealment. Preferences are usually 
assumed to be quasilinear: 
ui(y,xi)=v(y) +xi                                                         (1)   9 
where v(y) is  a strictly concave function of the level of public good provided y and xi 
is the bundle of private goods or a “composite commodity” or a “divisible numeraire” 
(Ledyard, 1994, Healy 2006). Two features of this formulation are important to note. 
First, the additive structure implies substitutability of the private and public goods. 
This is necessary to interpersonal comparison of utility. Since everyone has a 
common currency, the numeraire, and since the numeraire x and the valuation v are 
summed to form the overall utility, the valuation v must be expressed in terms of the 
units of the numeraire. This means that everyone’s utility units are expressed in the 
same currency and are therefore comparable. Second, the function is entirely 
deterministic. Direct revelation mechanisms provide the monetary measure of the 
utility change associated with a change in the provision of the public good y. 
 
Among the class of demand revealing mechanisms, the pivot process is a version of 
the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism with a binary public good (Tideman and 
Tullock 1976). It has been found to be the most stable and efficient among the public 
good mechanisms (Healy 2006). It also resembles a hypothetical WTP/WTA 
elicitation procedure. In the pivot mechanism, a public good of fixed description and 
size will either be provided or will not. Each individual transmits a private bid that 
could be either positive or negative valuation of changing from the status quo. Bids 
are all summed up, and the public good is provided if the positive bids are larger than 
the negative one. However, the pivot process contains a tax system: each individual 
whose bid changed the outcome (relative to what would have happened without her 
bid) is required to pay a tax equal to the amount of her bid which was required to 
switch the outcome. Suppose bids are collected among individual j and k for policy 
proposal A. They amount to -$20the policy is rejected. Suppose now that individual 
i bids  $25, so that the total of the bids is $5. The policy is implemented. According to 
the rules of the pivot mechanism, individual i pays a taxcalled Clarke Taxequal 
to the amount of her bid used to change the outcome of the policy decision that is, 
$20. A similar tax is calculated for every other individual. Those whose bids do not 
change the outcome do not pay taxtechnically they are not “pivot” players. 
 
Note that had player i understated her preference by an amount less than $5, she 
would have paid exactly the same tax. If she has understated her preference by more   10 
than $5, policy A would have been rejected. But player i would rather have A at the 
price of $20and gain at least $5 ($25-$20)than renounce A and gain nothing. 
Similarly, if a player overstates her preference, she either makes no difference in what 
is selected or what she pays, or she changes the result and pays more for her choice 
than it is worth to her. The pivot rule give players the choice of leaving the outcome 
unchanged or changing it at price equal to the reported net loss to the other players. If 
the value of the alternative is less than the net value to the other players, than it is 
rational to bid truthfully and leave the outcome unchanged. But it is also rational to 
bid truthfully when the player’s value for the policy is larger than the net value to the 
other players. Understating values, players may pass the opportunity to obtain the 
desired outcome at an attractive price.  
 
The Clarke tax is indeed a peculiar tax mechanism. It is important, then, to instruct 
players of the properties of the game and provide training and time for the subjects to 
learn the dominant-strategy bidding features of the mechanism. Unless the objective 
of the game is to understand the propensity of participants to the use of decision rules, 
instructing respondents about the demand-strategy properties would not change the 
preference structure. It could also reduce the noise associated with misconception and 
random bidding (Harrison, 2006, Plott and Zeiler 2005). 
 
3. Features of the Choice Modelling method. 
The  Choice  Modelling  (CM)  technique  has  been  increasingly  applied  in 
environmental valuation (Adamowicz 2004). It is a technique belonging to Conjoint 
Analysis, a set of experimental tools designed in the early 1960s by mathematical 
psychologists  (McFadden  1986,  Mackenzie  1993).  CM  combines  Lancaster’s 
approach to consumer theory with Random Utility Theory (Louviere et al. 2000). 
Individuals are assumed to choose the alternative that yields the highest utility. Each 
alternative’s utility is represented by a utility function Ui that contains an observable 
(deterministic) element Vi and a stochastic element εi: 
Ui=Vi + εi                                                                 (2) 
The alternative’s characteristics–or attributes–enter the deterministic element of the 
utility function. An individual will choose alternative i if Ui>Uj for all i≠j. Since the 
stochastic elements are not observed, the analyst can only describe the probability of   11 
choosing i as: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] C j V V chosen is i j j i i ∈ ∀ + > + = ε ε Pr Pr              (3) 
where C is the set of all possible alternatives.  Probabilities of choice can be computed 
from  (3)  once  the  distribution  of  the  error  terms  is  specified.  The  deterministic 
component  is  usually  specified  a  linear, additive  function  of  the  choice attributes 
(Louviere et al. 2000): 
Vi=Σi βik Xik                                                             (4) 
where βik is a parameter vector conditional on a matrix of k alternative’s attributes. In 
a CM experiment, subjects are presented with several alternatives usually partitioned 
in choice sets of two or three. What researchers observe in this experimental setting is 
a  series  of  yes/no  answers  that  indicate  which  alternative  provide  the  maximum 
utility.  βik is estimated as the set of parameters that maximise the utility of the chosen 
alternatives.  
 
The alternatives presented to the subjects are selected from the universe of possible 
alternatives  by  a  mechanism  called  design  of  experiment  (Louviere  et  al.  2000).  
Consultation with experts, focus group and pilot studies are usually set up with the 
purposes of identifying the attributes and their levels. Variables that are expected to 
affect the utility of any alternative but that do not vary across alternatives, such as 
socio-economic characteristics and distance, have to be interacted with choice specific 
attributes. The great advantage of the CM technique is the possibility of breaking 
down the observable element of utility function into explanatory variables that can 
strategically varied by the researcher. It allows estimating marginal values for each 
single  attribute  that  enter  Vi,  testing  its  significance  and  evaluating  the  welfare 
impacts of policies as different bundles of attributes.  
 
4. Overcoming differences in CM and PP. 
The main differences between CM and PP derive from their respective behavioural 
models and the data they generate. The PP provides a deterministic monetary measure 
of the utility associated with alternative i. The CM gives an estimates of utility of 
alternative  i  conditional  on  the  structure  of  the  error  terms  ε  and  the  matrix  X 
describing  the  alternative  and  individual  characteristics.  Differences  could  be 
minimised by:   12 
 
(a) Lancasterizing the PP model. This means specifying the same functional form and 
arguments of the v(g) term in PP and V(X) in CM. Apart from preserving strictly 
concavity and quasilinearity, there are no other technical reasons that prevent v(g) to 
use  a  description  of  a  policy  as  a  bundle  of  attributes.  This  is  the  Lancaster’s 
approach used in CM. Because usually the set of attributes in CM contains a monetary 
attribute, it works as the numeraire as the composite good in the PP utility model. 
Using the same public good both in CM and PP means that in both institutions there is 
no actual provision of public good.  
 
(b) Randomising the utility function in PP. Introducing an error term in PP could be 
justified by the hypothetical nature of the market, i.e. the public goods do not get 
delivered. This error could be interpreted as idiosyncrasies in preferences associated 
with the hypothetical nature of the experiment and the real economic incentive. This 
approach has the advantage of producing estimates of utility parameters that can be 
compared to those estimated in CM. It would be possible then to test if the underlying 
preference structures are the same by comparing estimated utility parameters. This 
approach relies on the availability of a sufficient number of observations in PP for a 
reliable regression analysis.  
 
(c)  Impose  the  same  functional  forms  on  utility  functions.  The  PP  use  a  strictly 
concave quasi linear function. The CM uses a linear in parameters function. A strictly 
concave form  in  CM  would  require  interaction  terms–and  hence  a  more  complex 
experimental design that allows second or higher order interactions.  
 
(d) Organise practice  rounds and training.  The CM  is itself organised as a set  of 
choice tasks. Some of these choice tasks should be interpreted as training rounds and 
not  used  in  parameter  estimates.  Indeed,  Swait  and  Adamowicz  (2001)  note  that 
variance of estimates decreases as participants in CM move through the choice tasks. 
Following Plott and Zeiler (2005) practice rounds and training should be part of both 
PP and CM.  
 
Points (a), (c) and (d) do not pose exceptional challenges. More difficult–and 
probably controversial–is the proposal in point (b). In support of the randomisation of   13 
the PP utility function is the extensive evidence that, even in the best of conditions, 
only around half of the subjects choose the dominant strategy–i.e. truth-telling–in PP 
games (Attiyeh et al. 2000, Kawagoe and Mori 2001, Healy 2006). There is clearly 
something that researchers–and possibly the subjects themselves–are disregarding or 
misinterpreting. The error terms would capture the unobservable elements of the 
decision process in the PP environment.   
 
5. Conclusion. 
Relatively few applications have made use of laboratory elicitation procedures with 
incentive compatible mechanisms to replicate hypothetical markets created with 
stated preference methods. The complementary use of the two methodologies has the 
potential of providing useful insight both on the hypothetical bias created by stated 
preference methods, and on the dreaded WTP/WTA disparity so often recorded in the 
literature.  
 
While the both the methodologies seem to be flexible enough to accommodate 
specific experimental needs, only a field trial would probably dispels hopes and make 
problems evident. There are always problems in mixing and matching different 
institutions. Strictly adherence to best practice both in state preference application and 
laboratory experiments would assure study replicability and comparability.  
 
The promise of combining hypothetical survey and responses that entail real 
economic commitment in the context incentive compatible institutions is the 
possibility of a calibration procedure. Calibration would validate a good hypothetical 
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Figure 1. Market and hypothetical data and the elicitation techniques. 
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